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Abstract—Reber and Alcock have recently made a sharp attack on the 
entire psi literature, and in particular a recent overview by Cardeña of the 
meta-analyses across various categories of psi. They claim the data are in-
herently fl awed because of their disconnect with our current understand-
ing of the world. As a result, they ignore the data and identify key scientifi c 
principles that they argue clash with psi. In this Commentary, I argue that 
these key principles are diffi  cult to apply in areas where our understanding 
remains poor, especially quantum mechanics and consciousness. I also ex-
plore how the psi data may fi t within these two domains.
Introduction
Recently, the journal American Psychologist published a paper by Etzel 
Cardeña that summarized the meta-analyses on various modes of psi and 
provided as well historical and theoretical background (Cardeña, 2018). 
Cardeña’s paper is most notable with its comprehensive approach. The 
presented meta-analyses give us perhaps the best bird’s-eye view of psi 
research to date. The combined studies include various modes or categories 
of psi, as well as different experimental designs for each one. In the paper, 
Cardeña claims that the overall evidence “provides cumulative support 
for the reality of psi, which cannot be readily explained away by the 
quality of the studies, fraud, selective reporting, experimental or analytical 
incompetence, or other frequent criticisms” (Cardeña, 2018, p. 1). He also 
notes that the rigor of the psi experimental methodology has increased with 
time, often including analyses for possible publication bias as well as the 
quality of the studies.
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Possibly because psi remains very controversial, American Psychologist 
followed with another paper, by Arthur Reber and James Alcock, that 
sharply criticized Cardeña’s paper, as well as the fi eld as a whole (Reber & 
Alcock, 2019a). However, it would probably be more accurate to say that 
they dismissed all of the psi research that has been performed and published 
to date. In their critique, Reber and Alcock ignore the data Cardeña presents 
and instead argue why real psi effects simply cannot exist. Although they 
do not explicitly acknowledge that they ignored the data in their paper for 
American Psychologist, they do make this clear in a companion essay:
We did not examine the data for psi, to the consternation of the parapsy-
chologist who was one of the reviewers. Our reason was simple: The data 
are irrelevant. We used a classic, rhetorical device, adynaton, a form of hy-
perbole so extreme it is, in eff ect, impossible. Ours was “pigs cannot fl y”—
hence data that show they can are the result of fl awed methodology, weak 
controls, inappropriate data analysis, or fraud. (Reber & Alcock, 2019b, p. 8)
 
Let’s at least give them this: It’s not every day we encounter an 
argument that invokes scientifi c principles to make the case for ignoring 
the data. Of course, this strategy of argument might worry anyone familiar 
with the history of science (or just about any aspect of science). But Reber 
and Alcock are unworried. They hinge their argument on what they view as 
the confl ict between the psi data and four key scientifi c principles: causal 
mechanism, time’s arrow, thermodynamics, and the inverse square law. The 
authors then proceed to discuss each of these areas of physics and how the 
psi data clash with it. 
In my paper, I will focus on Reber and Alcock’s (2019a) attack on psi, 
rather than on Cardeña’s summary overview. In the next section, I’ll take 
a closer look at their claims on the ways that psi confl icts with established 
scientifi c principles. I’ll follow that section with more discussion of 
quantum mechanics. After that, I’ll take a critical look at some of the ways 
that Reber and Alcock characterize the psi research. Next, I’ll examine their 
argument that psi cannot be real on the basis of David Hume’s argument 
against miracles. I’ll follow this with a section on the persistent mystery of 
consciousness. A brief conclusion is provided at the end. 
Psi versus Four Scientifi c Principles
Reber and Alcock (2019a) list four crucial ways that psi confl icts with our 
scientifi c understanding: 1) lack of a causal mechanism, 2) time reversal and 
the fl ipping of cause and effect, 3) violation the laws of thermodynamics, 
and 4) violations of the inverse square law. One red fl ag right off the 
bat is that Reber and Alcock do not justify any of these criteria from the 
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philosophy of science literature that concerns the demarcation question. 
Perhaps they think these four principles are obvious and that everyone 
should agree on them. But the fact that Reber and Alcock make no attempt 
to fi t it within the relevant literature raises the possibility that their list is an 
ad hoc construction designed only to attack psi, and has no relevance for 
science in general. If so, their justifi cation for ignoring the psi data would 
seem precarious. And suppose there are non-psi theories that clashed with 
one or more of their selected scientifi c principles? Would they be prepared 
to attack them as well? In any case, let’s consider each of these principles 
in turn.
Lack of causal mechanism. With regard to this fi rst principle, the 
authors boldly declare: “Science is mechanistic; reliable phenomena are 
viewed in the context of bridging principles that allow for the identifi cation 
of causal links for observed effects” (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 2). But one 
might wonder about cases where the mechanisms or causal links are not yet 
uncovered. That is, perhaps today we observe something that we cannot 
account for with a mechanism, but perhaps later we will. Can’t we develop 
something preliminary or speculative, that eventually gets us toward a more 
developed theory? Reber and Alcock apparently rule this out, at least for 
psi. Unless the mechanism can be specifi ed, or analyzed in the context of 
mechanisms we currently understand, the data must be faulty. 
But strangely, just a few words later, Reber and Alcock pivot and recount 
the example of Newton’s law of gravity and its apparent action at a distance. 
This was considered suspect, they explain, until Einstein’s richer theory of 
general relativity came on the scene. So, on one hand, they argue that the psi 
data cannot be true because no causal mechanism has been identifi ed. But 
their argument proceeds to include a famous example of a useful theory that 
did not specify a mechanism for a very long time. They go on to list other 
examples of preliminary theories that went on to be better developed and 
accepted over time. But because no causal mechanisms have been identifi ed 
with parapsychology (at least so far), the experimental fi ndings must be 
wrong. So, with this inconsistency right out of the gate, Reber and Alcock 
make a bit of a stumble.
But is it the case that all scientifi c theories simply must identify a causal 
mechanism? Perhaps this is a reasonable characterization for classical 
physics, but this is not the case with quantum mechanics. In the standard 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, you have a wave function that is 
described by the Schrödinger equation, until a measurement is taken, and 
then the wave function “collapses” into the experimental observations.1 
No one has as yet suggested a mechanism for this wave function collapse. 
There are in fact so many unresolved questions (such as what counts as 
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a measurement) around this notion of collapse that fi nding a mechanism 
might be the least pressing issue among quantum physicists.
Of course, there have been efforts to move away from the standard 
or Copenhagen interpretation. There are, for example, objective collapse 
theories, but these don’t identify mechanisms of collapse either. There is 
also the hidden variables approach, which is usually associated with David 
Bohm’s guidance equation. And as a matter of fact, Bohm opposed the idea 
that quantum systems could be understood in mechanistic terms. Consider 
his (along with his colleague Basil Hiley) description of a quantum system:
The relationship between parts of a system . . . implies a new quality of 
wholeness [italics in original] of the entire system going beyond anything 
that can be specifi ed solely in terms of the actual spatial relationships of all 
the particles. This is indeed the feature which makes the quantum theory 
go beyond mechanism of any kind. (Bohm & Hiley, 1993, p. 58)
 
Another interesting area obviously relevant to the psi data is the area 
of consciousness. Currently there is no known mechanism for generating 
consciousness. As I’ll discuss later, some philosophers of mind consider 
the possibility that consciousness is fundamental in some sense. Thus, 
there are at least two interesting areas of inquiry that apparently do not 
lend themselves to mechanistic frameworks: quantum mechanics and 
consciousness. And it so happens that the psi data appear to fall into the 
domains of both of these. 
Time reversal and the fl ipping of cause and effect. Next, Reber and 
Alcock argue that the mode of psi known as precognition requires a sort of 
time reversal that turns around the essential order of cause and effect. With 
regard to precognition, the authors are quite categorical. “Nowhere in the 
rest of science,” they claim, “not even quantum mechanics, where a host 
of strange effects like quantum entanglement are accepted as real, is such a 
notion even considered” (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 3).
But this is quite wrong. Cardeña mentions two infl uential quantum 
physicists who have considered exactly that: David Bohm and Henry Stapp. 
The physicist Bohm has proposed that quantum systems might be governed 
by an underlying nonlocal fi eld, characterized by potentialities. Further, he 
has suggested that precognition may involve an ability to perceive these 
potentialities (Bohm, 1996, pp.131–132). That is, instead of information 
traveling backward in time, Bohm suggests we are simply aware of current 
probabilities of future events. Also, Henry Stapp (2017) makes a similar 
conjecture. However, Stapp proposes that precognition might refl ect an 
ability to slightly bias the Born probabilities so that events unfold according 
to (perhaps unconscious) mental intention (Stapp, 2017, p. 77).
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It is also the case that Roger Penrose, a rather famous physicist and 
mathematician whom Reber and Alcock cite in their paper, has collaborated 
with Stuart Hameroff on a framework where conscious experience is 
generated through quantum processes within the brain. In their proposed 
model, conscious experience emerges from a sort of quantum computing 
within the brain’s microtubules. But especially important for our purposes 
here is that Penrose and Hameroff have suggested that their model may be 
consistent with temporal anomalies of the sort reported by Bem (Hameroff 
& Penrose, 2014, p. 63).
Reber and Alcock simply dismiss Sheehan’s (2015) exploration of the 
possibilities of retrocausality. However, as Sheehan (2015) notes, there is 
currently no consensus on the right interpretation of quantum mechanics, and 
some interpretations do seem consistent with some notion of retrocausality. 
He specifi cally discusses Cramer’s (1986) framework inspired from earlier 
work between John Wheeler and Richard Feynman. Cramer’s transactional 
interpretation obviates the necessity of measurement to “collapse the wave 
function.” According to his theory, observable quantum results are the 
result of a “handshake” of two waves of differing temporal orientation, 
one moving forward in time and the other one backward. Kastner (2012) 
proposes that these waves actually exist as possibilities outside of physical 
spacetime. 
The violation of the laws of thermodynamics. Next, Reber and 
Alcock claim that psi violates the laws of thermodynamics in two broad 
classes of experiments. In the case of precognition, they argue that this 
class of experiment presumes “a substanceless future has an impact on 
choices made by a material human in the present.” They note that this 
would require creating matter or energy out of a world “lacking ontological 
status and having no existential reality” (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 4). To 
my knowledge, no psi advocate (or anyone else) has proposed anything 
like this. (Reber and Alcock provide no citations on this.) I don’t see how 
precognition entails that kind of story. In any case, I’ve already touched on a 
number of ways theories in quantum mechanics might support precognition.
These authors also claim that psychokenisis confl icts with the laws 
of thermodynamics. But they don’t explain how. Instead, they move on 
to argue that the small effects require meta-analysis, which apparently for 
them makes it inherently suspect.2 They next argue that if psychokinesis 
were indeed real, it should be exploitable in casinos. This is a fair point, but 
not a compelling one. Casinos have drastically different environments from 
the laboratories producing the experimental results. And it seems reasonable 
to me that psychokinesis is sensitive to changes in the environment. Also, 
the evidence on psychokinesis appears largely attributable to especially 
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talented participants. Further, the reported effects sizes are so small, using 
such anomalous perturbation would likely require sitting for a relatively 
long time. But casinos are not hospitable environments for maintaining 
calm and concentration over relatively long periods.
Violations of inverse square laws. Reber and Alcock also argue that 
the invariance of psi effects with respect to distance is also disqualifying. 
Of course, it is the case that an inverse square relationship generally 
characterizes all physical forces. However, quantum entanglement is not 
subject to such a constraint, and this fact has intrigued psi researchers. Could 
this be an important clue on the nature of psi? The skeptics are quick to 
dismiss the possibility. In their words: “There is no claim of a transmission 
of energy between the separated particles, only that they are ‘entangled’” 
(Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 4).
It is true that quantum entanglement as most physicists understand it 
does not allow for a novel form of information or energy transmission. 
But energy or information transmission might not be required for some 
forms of psi. Telepathy or remote viewing, for example, perhaps only 
involves nonlocal correlations between processes in our unconsciousness 
and the environment. And as I’ve noted above, quantum physicists such 
as Bohm and Stapp have considered that precognition and presentiment 
might refl ect the ability to sense probabilities of future events. This more 
probabilistic aspect of reality would likely have nonlocal features. Thus, 
possible interpretations currently on the table could support some forms of 
psi despite such violations of the inverse square relationships. 
In addition, Bohm (1986) explores a framework that would support 
nonlocal features in anomalous perturbation. In Bohm’s implicate order 
framework, mental intention might infl uence the underlying quantum fi eld, 
characterized by potentialities and “active information,” and could in turn 
infl uence the behavior of the particles governed by that fi eld. All in all, the 
nonlocal behavior of quantum systems appears to keep the door open for 
phenomena that do not follow inverse square relationships.
As I’ve noted, by choosing to simply ignore the data, Reber and 
Alcock are choosing a route that runs counter to the lessons that the history 
of science has shown us. Blocking out the data using a constructed set of 
principles seems highly problematic, given that our understanding of the 
world is incomplete. There are indeed good reasons to think that their 
preferred list cannot completely characterize the behavior of all facets of 
our reality. Further, their additional tendency to make odd or unnecessary 
assumptions around a given psi category in order to generate a clash with 
their principles doesn’t inspire confi dence.
S h o u l d  We  Ac c e p t  A rg u m e n t s  f r o m  S k e p t i c s  t o  I g n o r e  Ps i  D a t a ?  629
On Quantum Mechanics
A chief problem that Reber and Alcock face is that the psi data arguably 
fall into areas that we continue to struggle to understand, such as quantum 
mechanics and consciousness. As they apply their list of principles in ways 
that confl ict with psi, they appear to rely on a rather narrow reading of 
quantum mechanics. But the underlying ontology of quantum mechanics 
remains murky. As I noted above, some interpretations of quantum 
mechanics might be quite friendly to the psi data.
Also, the authors appear excessively willing to impose constraints 
on the theory that have little grounding in what we currently understand. 
Consider this line of argument (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 5):
Quantum mechanics is a theory about processes that occur at the micro-
physical level of individual particles based on mathematical models [italics 
original]. It can be understood only from the point of view of the mathemat-
ics; its coherence is in the formulae, not in everyday macroreality. Physicist 
Richard Feynman famously noted on more than one occasion, “It is safe 
to say that nobody understands quantum mechanics” (1965, p. 129), and 
mathematical physicist Roger Penrose, who argued that consciousness 
emerges in quantum mechanical processes in microtubules in neural tis-
sue, put it succinctly: “Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense” 
(Penrose, 1989). 
Notice the weak support the above quotes provide for their arguments. While 
it’s true that our current understanding of quantum mechanics is based on 
the formalism of the Schrödinger equation, the quotes from Feynman and 
Penrose emphasize what we don’t understand rather than what we do. Then 
Reber and Alcock follow with this:
What both are expressing is that the axiomatic structure of quantum mech-
anics is grounded in the formalisms of logic and their representations are 
independent of any particular macroreality. (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 5)
I can’t fi nd anything like that in the quotes from Feynman and Penrose. 
In any case, this statement is simply wrong. The wave function within 
the Schrödinger equation is highly context-dependent on all aspects of 
the quantum system, including the experimental apparatus. Any decision 
on how we design an experiment or what item of interest to observe has 
signifi cant effects on the structure of the wave function.3 
The problem Reber and Alcock have with trying to pin down quantum 
mechanics in ways that rule out experimental evidence they dislike can 
be illustrated in a related debate regarding the role of quantum mechanics 
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in biology, explored in McFadden and Al-Khalili (2014). They describe 
how a group of physicists at MIT, experts in quantum mechanics, became 
incredulous at research conducted at Berkeley on quantum behavior being 
found in conjunction with photosynthesis in plants. They believed the results 
to be impossible and quite hilarious, because the relatively warm and noisy 
environments within plants should be hostile to quantum behavior. However, 
they sent a colleague to investigate and he determined that the reports were 
accurate. Quantum coherence was key for transferring captured photon 
energy through such a relatively warm but highly organized interior of the 
leaf. In their book, McFadden and Al-Khalili (2016) describe how quantum 
behavior is expanding in other areas relevant to biological processes. 
So, to characterize all of this, we have two non-physicists shouting from 
the hilltops that some things are absolutely impossible, while at the same 
time some well-regarded quantum physicists are exploring the possibility 
of those very things. Their refusal to examine the data is uncomfortably 
similar to the priests who refused to look through Galileo’s telescope.4 It’s 
not really clear they understand what the physicists they cite are saying. 
And among their cited physicists, I fi nd only one who explicitly argues that 
psi is inconsistent with known science and what we are likely to know: the 
cosmologist Sean Carroll. But Carroll is an odd choice for advising us on 
distinguishing science and pseudoscience.
The authors note that Carroll (2008) has “shown that no physical force 
could account for the results supposedly found in studies of psychokinesis.” 
Not exactly. Carroll (2008) argued in an essay for online Discovery Magazine 
(and his blog) that our current understanding of physics is not consistent 
with the spoon bending form of psychokinesis. But while he didn’t address 
the forms of psychokinesis presented by Cardeña, Carroll appears to be 
a card-carrying psi skeptic, and it’s more than likely he would generalize 
his argument to apply toward other forms of psychokinesis. In response to 
Damien Broderick’s challenge to look at the psi evidence, Carroll replied:
Direct investigations into parapsychology are not completely irrelevant; 
however, given the fact that the phenomena are incompatible with the 
laws of physics that have been tested to exquisite precision in an enormous 
variety of circumstances, I think their relevance is pretty darn minuscule. [If ] 
the choice is between believing in sloppy research/confi rmation bias, etc., 
and believing that quantum fi eld theory is violated in some tangible mac-
roscopic way that has never been noticed in any physical experiment, I will 
surely choose the former. It’s not really a close call. . . . I gave an argument—
which nobody has refuted, or seemingly even tried to—that telekinesis is 
incompatible with what we know about how nature works. Given that, I’m 
not going to waste my time looking into the claims to the contrary. Life is 
too short to take every claim seriously. (Broderick & Goertzel, 2014, p. 26)
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Essentially, Carroll’s (2008) argument is that “in the modern framework 
of fundamental physics, not only do we know certain things, but we have 
a very precise understanding of the limits of our reliable knowledge.” He 
proceeds with a summary of what we now know about particles and forces 
and on the extreme unlikelihood of a new force arising due to the copious 
experiments we’ve conducted. After arguing the impossibility that current 
known forces might be responsible for psychokinesis, Carroll reasons that 
it also is extremely unlikely that any new force might exist to account for 
psychokinesis.
However, in other work, Carroll recognizes that we remain fundamentally 
ignorant on a great deal that happens in the domain of quantum mechanics, 
as well as how our consciousness might interact with it. Consider a recent 
essay by Carroll published in The New York Times (Carroll, 2019). There, 
Carroll acknowledged: “Physicists don’t understand their own theory any 
better than a typical smartphone user understands what’s going on inside 
the device.” He goes on to characterize the mystery in the following way:
When we’re not looking, they [quantum objects] exist in “superposi-
tions” of diff erent possibilities, such as being at any one of various locations 
in space. But when we look they suddenly snap into just a single location, 
and that’s where we see them. We can’t predict exactly what that location 
will be; the best we can do is calculate the probability of diff erent outcomes. 
The whole thing is preposterous. Why are observations special? What 
counts as an “observation,” anyway? When exactly does it happen? Does it 
need to be performed by a person? Is consciousness [italics original] some-
how involved in the basic rules of reality? Together these questions are 
known as the “measurement problem” of quantum theory.
Carroll here appears to acknowledge not only that we remain ignorant at a 
deep level about quantum mechanics, but that our consciousness might be 
involved in a subtle way. This view is rather diffi cult to reconcile with his 
hostility to looking at the psi data. 
And Carroll is a controversial choice to cite on the nature of 
pseudoscience for another reason: He is a strong and well-known advocate 
of Everett’s many worlds theory. Briefl y, Everett argued thata we should 
not go beyond the Schrödinger equation in explaining quantum behavior. 
And according to his view, each possible observation is instantiated. We 
should interpret quantum mechanics therefore as a continuous branching 
of our universe into countless other universes.5 However, because these 
are separate, they cannot be observed or tested. One might think that this 
presents a falsifi cation problem. Many physicists do think this, but not 
Carroll. He has argued that falsifi cation is likely an overrated virtue for 
theories of a certain class (Carroll, 2018).6
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Carroll has also explored some very interesting possibilities within the 
Everett framework. In an interview, Carroll discussed joint work with Alan 
Guth, where different universes might co-exist with different arrows of time 
(Sokol, 2016). Carroll reveals in the interview that an important motivation 
was the question of why time’s arrow points in one direction. “There’s no 
such thing, at a very deep level, that causes [must] precede effects,” says 
Carroll (apparently demoting one of Reber and Alcock’s key principles). 
The work is highly speculative, yet nevertheless explores how different 
pocket universes manifest time moving forward or backward.7
My aim here is not to criticize the many worlds interpretation, although 
it is true that I’m not an advocate. I do believe there is value in putting radical 
ideas on the table, especially in areas that resist our efforts to explain. That 
said, my view is that the weight we assign to likely explanations should be 
proportional to the evidence provided, and in that respect many worlds falls 
short. But here I am mainly curious how Carroll, an advocate with a radical 
theory with no evidence and who brushes aside issues of falsifi ability, 
somehow manages to play a role as an authority on pseudoscience and psi, 
the latter for which he has little knowledge. 
But now I’d like to consider how some of Carroll’s theories might fare 
with the scientifi c principles that Reber and Alcock used to dismiss the psi 
data. Would they insist that Carroll identify a mechanism through which 
the universe continues to split? (I am unaware of any mechanism being 
introduced.) How would their arrow of time criteria work in a theory that 
posits different universes with time moving in different directions? (I’ve 
already noted that Carroll doesn’t seem to hold the “arrow of time” at the 
same level of esteem as Reber and Alcock.) Also, I would very much like 
to know: Given the rather extraordinary claims of the multiverse theory, 
would Reber and Alcock insist on extraordinary evidence?
A Poor Characterization of the Psi Literature
We’ve seen that Reber and Alccok will likely have diffi culty applying their 
key scientifi c principles in other areas of science we currently understand 
poorly. With that in mind, let’s return to their characterization of the psi 
literature. As I’ve noted, they simply dismiss it in its entirety. 
Claims of evidence for psi are announced, only to later fall into disregard. 
Theories are enunciated and later abandoned. Methodologies are intro-
duced, found wanting, discarded, and sometimes recycled. Each new pro-
cedure is introduced with claims of success, followed by failures to replicate, 
followed in turn by the publication of meta-analyses that are claimed to res-
cue the eff ect of interest. As excitement about each new procedure wanes, 
a resurgence of interest develops when another, apparently successful pro-
cedure is reported. (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 1)
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There isn’t much justifi cation for this sweeping claim apart from a 
controversial report from the National Research Council (Druckman & 
Swets, 1988).8 We also can note that this report precedes all of the meta-
analyses that Cardeña presents. Just a little further, these psi skeptics press 
their case and assert: 
The single feature that marks this extended period of research involving 
literally thousands of published papers, hundreds of conferences and meet-
ings, and dozens of review volumes . . . is that nothing has been learned. 
By their telling, the whole enterprise has been a waste of time. But no 
citation is offered to substantiate the claim.
But later in the paper, they note that Greenhouse (1991), a statistician 
and psi critic, acknowledges that parapsychologists should not be held to a 
higher standard than other scientists. However, Reber and Alcock strongly 
disagree. They “dispute this proposition in the strongest of terms. When 
confronted with ‘miraculous’ claims, standard procedure is precisely the 
opposite” (Reber & Alcock, 2019a, p. 6). But then what do we make of 
their claims that the psi results are ephemeral and unrepeatable? If their 
characterizations of psi being riddled by failures to replicate are accurate, 
why is it necessary to abandon normal standards of evaluation? Science 
depends crucially on a “let the chips fall where they may” attitude toward 
the evidence. Apparently, Reber and Alcock are not prepared to accept such 
terms here. But then how can science progress if we are allowed to shift 
the standards for evaluation whenever it suits us? Naturally, such a position 
raises troubling implications for scientifi c inquiry much broader than psi. 
Can such a position be defended by those seeking some authoritative role 
in scientifi c discourse? 
This sort of rhetorical back-fl ip illustrates the nature of how these 
authors inaccurately characterize the literature. I’ll focus on another 
troubling example regarding their treatment of Daryl Bem. 
We should note that Bem’s (2011) precognition experiments were 
unusually innovative in a number of respects. Bem specifi ed nine different 
experiments that time reversed various well-known psychological functions. 
In one example, participants were asked to choose between two curtains 
which one would reveal an erotic picture. Unknown to the participants, the 
picture was selected randomly by the computer after participants made their 
selection. In another case, Bem reversed a psychological priming effect in 
order to investigate the effect of a subminal message on participants—
but after a selection was made by each participant (p. 633). Bem found 
statistical signifi cance with eight of the nine time-reversed experiments. 
However, Bem also took the unusual step of making all of his software 
publicly available so that researchers could very quickly and easily get to 
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work on replication. Eventually, 90 different studies were performed on 
Bem’s precognition experiments. While Bem’s fi ndings were not replicated 
in every case, the overall meta-analysis showed small but very statistically 
signifi cant effects.9
The meta-analysis also revealed an intriguing pattern: Experiments 
associated with what Kahneman terms “thinking fast” modes of cognition 
were statistically signifi cant, while those associated with “thinking slow” 
weren’t. “Thinking fast” modes of cognition are generally unconscious 
processes, while more conscious mediated modes are associated with 
“thinking slow.” This suggests possible links with recently developed 
theories, such as fi rst-sight and psi-mediated instrumental response, that 
integrate psi with unconscious cognitive processes.
Reber and Alcock paint a different story. They acknowledge that Bem’s 
(2011) fi ndings generated a great deal of attention, which they attribute in 
large part to his relatively strong stature from previous work. But they cast 
some doubt on his results by noting that replications were hard to come by. 
But this is immediately followed by acknowledging that the meta-analysis 
demonstrated real (albeit small) effects confi rming Bem. They don’t bother 
discussing the apparent contradiction.10 
Rather than Bem’s original study or the meta-analysis that followed, 
Reber and Alcock focus their attention on a short extract of an interview 
with Bem taken from Engber (2017), an article on Bem’s research as well as 
its greater impact for psychology in general. I found Engber mildly critical 
of Bem’s fi ndings, but in a relatively even-handed and honest way. Reber 
and Alcock remove this extract from a short interview with Bem:
I’m all for rigor, but I prefer other people do it. I see its importance—it’s fun 
for some people—but I don’t have the patience for it. If you looked at all 
my past experiments, they were always rhetorical devices. I gathered data 
to show how my point would be made. I used data as a point of persuasion, 
and I never really worried about, “Will this replicate or will this not?” 
But Reber and Alcock edited out a short sentence from the extract, as 
well as failed to provide some necessary context. 
“I’m all for rigor,” he continued, “but I prefer other people do it. I see its impor-
tance—it’s fun for some people—but I don’t have the patience for it.” It’s been 
hard for him, he said, to move into a fi eld where the data count for so much. “If 
you looked at all my past experiments, they were always rhetorical devices. I 
gathered data to show how my point would be made. I used data as a point of 
persuasion, and I never really worried about, ‘Will this replicate or will this not?’ ”
As you can see, the original includes a sentence clarifying that Bem was 
adjusting to the diffi culties of changing into a fi eld where more attention is 
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paid to the underlying methods and data. His “past experiments,” where his 
focus was not so much on replication, were those of his previous mainstream 
work. This point is reinforced in the original text as Engber adds immediately 
following the extract, “When Bem started investigating ESP, he realized the 
details of his research methods would be scrutinized with far more care 
than they had before.” This is also an important recognition that psi studies 
typically receive more scrutiny than more conventional ones. And a mere 
three paragraphs down, Engber offered an illuminating exchange from a 
colleague of Bem:
“Credit to Daryl Bem himself,” Leif Nelson told me. “He’s such a smart, interesting 
man. . . . In that paper, he [Bem] actively encouraged replication in a way that no 
one ever does. He [Bem] said, ‘This is an extraordinary claim, so we need to be 
open with our procedures.’ . . . It was a prompt for skepticism and action.”
 
But Reber and Alcock leave out this admission that Bem acted aggressively 
to encourage replication. Thus, Reber and Alcock attempt to discredit Bem 
and the meta-analysis confi rming his fi ndings, not by fi nding fl aws in the 
method or data, but through extracting an excerpt from an interview in such 
a way that suggests the opposite meaning from what was intended in the 
original text. We might ask, if psi is genuinely as bogus as these critics 
claim, why are such mischaracterizations necessary?
Is Psi a Miracle?
Let’s recall Reber and Alcock’s core argument against using conventional 
standards to test for psi: Psi should be seen as something miraculous. But 
what exactly is the basis for this claim? It is diffi cult to say, beyond their 
argument that the psi data are inconsistent with more conventional theories 
and frameworks. As I’ve noted, quantum mechanics and consciousness also 
deviate in fundamental ways from established frameworks, but these are 
seldom classifi ed as miracles. So, what exactly constitutes a miracle and 
does psi qualify?
To clarify the problem, consider the following possibility in alternate 
history.11 Recall that Einstein famously attacked the nonlocal implications of 
quantum mechanics, which he referred to as “spooky action at a distance.” 
Consider Einstein using the same tactics as Reber and Alcock, insisting that 
the nonlocal behavior of quantum entanglement was impossible (violated 
relativity) and was therefore miraculous.  (It seems plausible that many could 
have considered the violation of locality to be a violation of an established 
scientifi c principle in the same sense that Reber and Alcock try to establish 
in their paper.) Let’s further suppose that Einstein simply dismissed any 
possible evidence supporting quantum entanglement. After all, he might 
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argue, Hume advises us that the likelihood of fraud or poor methodology 
is greater than the violation of a miracle. So apparently, labeling something 
‘miraculous,’ according to Reber and Alcock’s interpretation of Hume, 
gives one license to dismiss the data, no matter how much has accumulated 
and no matter how many different tests are devised. Clearly, we need to take 
a closer look at what Hume meant by ‘miracle.’
For Reber and Alcock, and other psi critics, David Hume’s argument 
against miracles is a dependable weapon in the war against psi.12 I believe 
Hume’s argument is indeed very formidable; however, I also believe the 
psi critics have used it carelessly. Hume’s argument is aimed primarily at 
religious miracles, described in religious texts. These include such marvelous 
events as the dead rising from the grave, severed limbs growing back, the 
blind being cured of their blindness. The few non-religious miracles Hume 
mentions include lead fl oating in the air and sea monsters.
The heart of Hume’s argument is the fallibility of human testimony. 
Hume lists the attributes of testimony that can be taken as credible and 
authoritative. These include testimony that agrees uniformly with other 
similar accounts, the manner of the delivered testimony, and the character 
providing the testimony. He puts great focus on the types of testimony 
that are uniform across many reports and that also agree with our own 
experiences. Hume then lists the ways that that testimony found in religious 
texts are found wanting. These typically arise in relatively remote areas 
where there are few witnesses. Testimony of a religious marvel often 
inspires a love of wonder or a kind of excited passion, and these he judges 
detrimental to more sober reasoning. Of course, he notes that dishonesty 
in testimony has occurred throughout history as well. Then Hume notes 
that religious miracles, such as raising the dead, clash strongly with the 
much more reasonable testimonies that we possess in much higher numbers 
and don’t clash with our own experiences. Thus, the fallibility of human 
testimony leads one side to be much more lacking in evidence than the 
other.
But Hume wasn’t addressing careful experimentation derived under 
laboratory conditions and ultimately evaluated through statistical techniques. 
This is something unacknowledged by the psi critics who borrow from 
Hume’s argument. It is by no means clear how or why Hume’s argument 
transfers to the laboratory, which employs methods to avoid the problems 
Hume describes, as well as sources of bias he doesn’t.
However, while his argument is applied to the fallibility of testimony, 
Hume does provide us with something that does indeed have relevance for 
modern statistical evaluation:
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A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such con-
clusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event 
with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a 
full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds 
with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers 
which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that 
side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fi xes his 
judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All 
probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, 
where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a 
degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances 
or experiments on one side, and fi fty on another, aff ord a doubtful expecta-
tion of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one 
that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. 
In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are op-
posite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know 
the exact force of the superior evidence. (Hume, 1902, p. 50)
How is this inconsistent with the methods used to investigate psi? 
Cardeña summarizes more than 1,000 studies, which cover various modes 
of psi such as remote viewing and precognition. In some cases, the data are 
broken down into subsets to improve homogeneity. Combining the data of 
individual studies improves our ability to evaluate the probabilities that an 
effect might be real or spurious. The psi data, evaluated this way, escape the 
problems of fallible testimony that Hume describes.
But critics of psi would argue that Hume’s argument implies that fraud 
is a greater likely explanation than some real effect. That is, psi skeptics 
tend to think that Hume’s argument, which focused on the fallibility of 
testimony of a religious nature, can simply be transferred to the modern 
lab to account for fi ndings that surprise them by invoking fraud.13 But such 
a step requires greater justifi cation. How can we simply extend the notion 
of false witness regarding religious miracles that occurred hundreds or 
thousands of years ago toward modern scientists and statisticians exploring 
in an unconventional direction? Of course, fraud in parapsychology has 
occurred, although no more than in other fi elds. But it’s important to note 
that such fraud was uncovered by other parapsychologists, peers of psi 
researchers reporting suspicious results. The results that Cardeña reports, 
involving more than 1,000 studies accumulated over decades in different 
laboratories, would require an unprecedented vast conspiracy among 
researchers. Scientists generally are wary of conspiracy theories for good 
reason. Obviously, it would be impossible to maintain such a conspiracy on 
this scale, with peers of psi researchers peeking over their shoulders. 
But perhaps Reber and Alcock simply hold that psi phenomenon 
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must be miraculous by defi nition. On the fi rst page of their critique, they 
casually lump various modes of psi, such as precognition and ganzfeld, with 
non-laboratory examples of paranormal phenomenon, such as ghosts and 
tarot card readings. The authors make no effort to avoid confl ating results 
obtained under controlled laboratory conditions, cumulated over decades, 
with other types of ostensible paranormal phenomena not addressed in 
Cardeña’s overview. Perhaps Reber and Alcock are deliberately trying to 
muddy the picture. Or perhaps they simply view all of these phenomenon as 
the same kind of thing. Perhaps in their view, the laboratory data suggesting 
modest degrees of precognition or remote viewing can simply be lumped 
together with the sort of religious miracles that Hume dismissed. I would 
argue that the data Cardeña summarizes should stand on their own, without 
confl ation with phenomena that are absent from the meta-analyses.
If we cast the notion of religious miracles aside, as well as other 
extraneous phenomenon not covered in the meta-analyses, what are 
we left with? Apparently, we have modes of anomalous cognition and 
perturbation with small effect sizes that are roughly in the ballpark with 
other psychological functions. Is there justifi cation for placing these outside 
the boundary of what’s possible? Or do we instead recognize these data, 
accumulated over decades under careful conditions, as simply something 
our current theories can’t yet account for? I’ve already noted how the 
paradoxical behavior of quantum mechanics suggests interpretations that 
appear quite hospitable to psi. In the next section, I’ll take up the problem 
of consciousness. 
The Persistent Mystery of Consciousness
I’ve noted earlier that there is no known mechanism for how collections 
of non-conscious particles become conscious. This suggests consciousness 
would present a problem for at least one of Reber and Alcock’s principles. 
In fact, the philosopher David Chalmers uses the notion of mechanism 
to help characterize what he terms the “hard problem of consciousness.” 
According to Chalmers, the easy problems of consciousness are those that 
can be explained in terms of computational or neuronal mechanisms. The 
hard problem, on the other hand, is the problem of experience itself. Most 
philosophers of mind use a phrase suggested by Nagel (1974) to characterize 
this purely subjective aspect: there is something it is like to be a conscious 
organism. 
This diffi culty of putting subjective consciousness into some kind of 
analytical framework presents another problem for psi critics. Reber and 
Alcock consider it problematic that psi effects cannot be properly defi ned 
(p. 7). This is a critique that has come up before. As Alcock put it: “. . . 
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unlike the various domains of mainstream science, it deals exclusively with 
phenomena that are only negatively defi ned” (Alcock, 2010, p. 33). But 
consciousness doesn’t fare any better on this score if Nagel’s characterization 
is the closest we can come to a defi nition. The phrase “there is something it 
is like to be a conscious organism” obviously doesn’t identify anything we 
can objectively test. And that is indeed the chief problem of consciousness: 
Its inherently subjective nature makes it very diffi cult (perhaps impossible) 
to fi t it into our objective understanding of the world.
Chalmers, Nagel, and others go so far as to argue that a purely physicalist 
or materialist framework cannot account for consciousness. They have 
deployed a number of philosophical arguments to make their case, which 
we don’t have space for here. We can note, however, that there is nothing 
in all of the mathematical equations that comprise our understanding of 
physics that even remotely hint toward how consciousness arises from 
non-conscious particles. Philosophers of mind such as Chalmers and Nagel 
argue that consciousness most likely is fundamental in some sense, not 
emergent from matter. They see this move as necessary because they see 
consciousness as essentially anomalous with respect to our conventional, 
physicalist understanding. But such philosophers of mind typically 
have little interest in religion (or psi for that matter). They are simply 
putting alternatives on the table that might be better able to account for 
consciousness. The upshot apparently is that we must accept our subjective 
experiences as real, but recognize the diffi culty accounting for them in a 
purely physical framework. 
The grounds that Reber and Alcock use to characterize psi as a miracle—
based on its diffi culty of being integrated into our scientifi c worldview—
likely applies to consciousness. But if we accept our phenomenal 
experiences as real, the better choice would be to view consciousness as 
anomalous with respect to our conventional understanding. If we accept 
consciousness as anomalous, we are obviously on weak ground to dismiss 
other sorts of anomalous data closely linked to consciousness. And I see 
no reason to classify psi phenomenon as any more miraculous than our 
conscious experience. I submit that Reber and Alcock’s characterization of 
psi as miraculous is unfounded. And a key component of their argument for 
dismissing the psi data collapses.
On the other hand, accepting the psi data may help us move forward in 
areas that we continue to struggle to understand. We might place less weight 
on interpretations of quantum mechanics that are inconsistent with psi. And 
our understanding of consciousness could be immeasurably deepened as 
well. While the psi data remain anomalous, the history of science suggests 
that this is simply not a good reason to ignore it. 
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Conclusion
Reber and Alcock (2019a,b) take what must be considered an extreme 
position: Dismiss the psi data presented by Cardeña (2018) and others on the 
grounds that they run afoul of key scientifi c facts. However, their extreme 
position can’t be justifi ed, primarily because current theories in such areas 
as quantum mechanics and consciousness do not appear to be constrained 
by such facts. The fi elds of quantum mechanics and consciousness are not 
well-characterized through mechanistic approaches, which have been used 
so successfully in classical mechanics. And arguably, the psi data capture 
phenomenon relevant to both consciousness and quantum mechanics.
Also, I submit that psi skeptics should consider more carefully the 
problem of consciousness. Our consciousness appears to be anomalous 
with respect to our conventional understanding of the world. It also appears 
to be the kind of thing that would also fare poorly with a number of key 
criticisms aimed at psi. If we take our subjective experiences as anomalous, 
as many infl uential philosophers of mind suggest, are we truly in a position 
to dismiss the psi data?
Notes
1  The wave function consists of a large vector of possible observations for 
something of interest, such as the spin or position of a particle. And these 
possible observations are entangled with other possible observations of 
the quantum system.
2 In a later section, they criticize combining individual studies into meta-
analysis on the grounds that such meta-analysis, based on fl awed indi-
vidual studies, must remain fl awed. However, they fail to identify what 
fl aws the original individual studies have.
3  Some have argued that the warm and noisy nature of our macro world 
likely rules out quantum effects. However, recent research in quantum 
biology challenges this view.
4  This may be an unfair comparison to the priests, who were not them-
selves claiming to be scientists.
5  There are various versions of Everett’s interpretation, which I won’t go 
into here. However, I believe I am capturing in broad strokes the rather 
straightforward version advocated by Carroll. 
6  This has led Baggott (2019) in a recent essay to note that Carroll and oth-
er advocates of the multiverse practice “post-empirical science,” which 
Baggott suggests can hardly be distinguished from pseudoscience. See 
Woit (2018) for another critical look at Carroll at 
 https://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=9938
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7 So while Carroll notes that life is too short to take every claim seriously, 
it is presumably not so short that he can’t explore extravagant theories 
that we have no way of testing.
8  Skeptical bias and other limitations of the report have been documented 
by Palmer, Honorton, and Utts (1989), Bem and Honorton (1994), and 
Carter (2012). 
9  The combined 90 studies of the meta-analysis in Bem et al. (2015) re-
ported a Z value of 6.40 and a p value of 1.2 × 10−10. By combining only 
those experiments associated with “thinking fast,” the results were a Z 
value of 7.11 and a p value of 5.8 × 10−13. 
10 It is of course possible that individual studies could show little or only 
marginal statistical signifi cance, yet would still contribute toward a very 
signifi cant effect overall when combined into a meta-analysis, due to the 
relatively large statistical power that psi studies require. This is also the 
case with conventional psychology studies where effect sizes are rela-
tively small or are infl uenced by a large number of factors.
11 I am indebted to Julia Mossbridge for suggesting this comparison. 
12 Price (1955) was one of the fi rst psi-skeptics to attack psi using Hume’s 
argument. Hume’s argument has also found its way into Wagenmakers 
et al.’s (2011) attack on Bem’s (2011) fi ndings of precognition. 
13 I do not fi nd in Reber and Alcock (2019a, 2019b) this argument explic-
itly; however. arguments of this sort can be found in Price (1955) and 
Wagenmakers et al. (2011). 
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